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With private-label mortgage-backed securities (MBS), investors bore
default risk. This risk should have been priced. As systemic risk grew, why
didn't the pricing of risk increase? We point to market institutions' incentive
misalignments that cause asset prices to rise above fundamentals, producing
systemic risk. The model attributes the asset price inflation to the provision of
underpriced credit as lending institutions misprice risk to gain market share.
The resulting asset price inflation itself then generates further expansion of
underpriced credit.
Introduction
Today's financial crisis is the result of market institutions' "rules of the
game" that produce systemic risk. In efficient markets, asset prices follow a
random walk. We point to market institutions' incentive misalignments that
cause asset prices to rise above fundamentals, producing systemic risk. We first
describe the pro-cyclical expansion of underpriced credit in the United States
that drove asset prices up. We then briefly present the basics of a model that
explains that this outcome is inevitable, given incentives to take risk to gain
short-term profits. The model attributes the asset price inflation to the provision
of underpriced credit as lending institutions misprice risk to gain market share.
The resulting asset price inflation itself then generates further expansion of
underpriced credit. We conclude with a discussion of why markets fail to
contain inflated asset prices through the short-selling of assets or indices of
assets and offer implications for market institutions going forward.
I. The Recent Deterioration of Lending Standards
The U.S. residential mortgage and housing markets are at the center of the
worldwide credit bubble and the subsequent financial crisis. The volatility
adjusted run-up in U.S. housing prices, particularly after 2003, exceeded price
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increases among all the major trading partners of the United States. Similarly,
the recent volatility-adjusted price decline is also more severe in the United
States than in its major trading partners.' The price and price-rent ratios that
were increasing in the United States before 2003 were attributable to interest
rate declines and income increases, but not so after 2003. The U.S. house price
run-up post-2003 was accompanied by a credit bubble as subprime and other
nontraditional mortgage lending took off in 2003. These loans differed from
previously prevalent securitized agency debt in their lower lending standards,
which, in turn, permitted constrained borrowers to overcome credit barriers and
increased the demand for homes.
As the amount of nonprime lending increased both absolutely and as a
share of overall lending, the price of risk imbedded in these loans, rather than
increasing as might have been expected, decreased, both relatively and
absolutely. For example, many of these loans were "teaser-rate" adjustable rate
mortgages (ARMs) 2 and as such were priced off of LIBOR. 3 Over time, the
margin over LIBOR decreased, despite the fact that as marginal borrowers
became homeowners, the average borrower became riskier.
As the demand for homes increased, with the marginal borrower now able
to overcome credit barriers, prices increased. Default rates, driven by loan-to-
value ratios, thus remained low. With rising home prices it might have seemed
reasonable that with the resetting of teaser-rate loans and recasting of option
ARMs, 4 it would not be a problem to refinance, since home prices would rise
and exceed debt levels.
Each nonrecourse mortgage loan contains an imbedded put option that
allows the borrower to "put" the property to the lender for the outstanding
balance of the loan by defaulting on the loan. In other words, the borrower
owns a put option that he can exercise against the lender to effectively sell the
I For a discussion of why this occurred in 2003 and the role of fundamentals in the pricing of
homes prior to 2003 but not after, see Andrey D. Pavlov, Zoltan Poznar & Susan M. Wachter, Subprime
Lending and Real Estate Markets (Univ. of Pa. Law School Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No.
08-35, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1319757. Appendix Figure 1, infra, displays the
volatility-adjusted price indices for eight international markets. Jesse M. Abraham, Andrey Pavlov &
Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the United States' Uniquely Bad Housing Market, 12 WHARTON REAL
ESTATE REv. 24 (2008). The U.S. housing market is a clear outlier in terms of its price run-up and
subsequent decline. For a history of the evolution of mortgage markets and their regulation, see Richard
K. Green & Susan M. Wachter, The Housing Finance Revolution, 31 ECON. POL'Y SYMP.: HOUSING,
HOUSING FIN., & MONETARY POL'Y, FED. RES. BANK OF KANSAS CITY (2007); Richard K. Green &
Susan M. Wachter, The American Mortgage in Historical and International Context, 19 J. ECON. PERSP.
93 (2005); and Patricia A. McCoy, Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, Systemic Risk Through
Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure (2009) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with Yale Journal on Regulation).
2 Teaser-rate ARMs are adjustable-rate mortgages with a low introductory "teaser rate,"
which is reset after two or three years to a higher interest rate.
3 The London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is an exchange-settled interest rate for low-
risk borrowers that is often used as a benchmark for risk-free lending.
4 Option ARMs are adjustable-rate loans that allow the borrower to choose the monthly
payment depending on their financial situation at the time. In particular, borrowers are allowed to make
payments that do not even cover the interest rate on the mortgage, thus allowing the balance of the
mortgage to increase over time.
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asset for the outstanding loan balance. The increased availability of lending at
lower borrowing costs is reflected in the lower price of these loans and the
underpricing of the put option embedded in these loans over time. This
underpricing allowed an increase in demand and an increase in the price of the
housing asset collateralized by the newly affordable lending. A housing price
increase of unprecedented magnitude made refinancing possible, forestalling
inevitable defaults and foreclosures and making nonprime lending appear safe.
The market share of nonprime loans grew from under fifteen percent in
2001 to almost half of originations by 2006 (the sum of the market share of
Helocs, Alt-A, and subprime as shown in Appendix Table 1).6 Within loan
types, consolidated transaction price-based loan-to-value ratios (CLTV) also
increased, as shown in Appendix Table 2. This implies that borrowers were
able to obtain financing with smaller and smaller down payments at the same or
declining borrowing costs. Also, Appendix Table 2 shows that as systemic risk
increased with higher CLTVs and with the growth in overall market share of
riskier loans, the price of risk did not increase. Poorly underwritten teaser-rate,
pay-option, and interest-only loans in particular began to comprise fifty percent
or more of the subprime origination market in many states. Such loans were
extended disproportionately in states where mortgages were previously not
affordable, thus temporarily expanding the market for homeownership and
driving up prices.
When credit conditions reversed in the spring of 2007, it was the markets
where nonprime had expanded the most that were particularly vulnerable to the
seizing up of nontraditional credit. Thus it was in the high priced, difficult-to-
develop "sand states," where housing was initially unaffordable, that housing
prices exploded with the wave of aggressive mortgage products and imploded
as credit dried up.7
The problems of falling house prices and mortgage defaults and
foreclosures, however, are no longer confined to the nonprime market. The
extension of credit to marginal buyers increased the price of all homes and the
subsequent withdrawal of credit reversed this change. Using reasonable 80%
loan-to-value ratios, homes that were originally carefully underwritten are now
also underwater. As home prices fall and unemployment rises, borrowers are
defaulting on these loans as well, although defaults and foreclosures are
greatest in markets where "aggressive lending" expanded loan demand.
5 See Andrey Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, The Inevitability ofMarketwide Underpricing of
Mortgage Default Risk, 34 REAL EST. ECON. 479 (2006).
6 "Heloc" stands for Home Equity Loan. "Alt-A" denotes alternative documentation loans,
that is, loans with limited documentation of income, asset value, or both. "Subprime" generally denotes
mortgage loans extended to borrowers with prior credit problems or who are riskier in some other
fashion.
7 See Figure 1, infra.
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II. Loan Underpricing and Asset Prices
In what follows we offer a model that links loan risk underpricing with
real-estate asset prices to explain why underpricing occurs. We identify the
conditions under which asset price increases are not incidental or accidental but
inevitable in the face of deteriorating lending standards. In other words, as the
risk premium on residential mortgages drops to an artificially low level, the
asset price of houses goes up, leading to an asset value appreciation. This
appreciation creates a false sense of security in the lenders and generates
further deterioration of lending standards and asset price increases.
A. Lending Standards and Asset Prices
Following our previous work,8 we note that the transaction price of an
asset financed through a nonrecourse loan is the composite of the fundamental
value of the asset, V, the market value of the mortgage loan, M, and the face
value of the adjustable-rate mortgage loan, B:
P = V(c) - M(c-, s(c-)) + B, (1)
where c denotes the expected future volatility of the asset and s denotes
the option-adjusted spread of lending over risk-free interest rates. 9 This spread
compensates the lender for the default risk of the mortgage. If this default risk
is priced correctly, then the market value and the face value of the mortgage are
the same, M(a, s(a)) = B, and the transaction price equals the fundamental
value of the asset. If the risk of default is underpriced, then the transaction price
of the real-estate asset reflects not only the fundamental value of the asset, but
also the mispricing of the mortgage, B - M(a, s(a)). If the market value of the
mortgage is below the face value of the mortgage, then the transaction price
exceeds the fundamental value of the asset because efficient equity markets
take advantage of the mispricing and the asset is assumed to be of fixed supply.
A change in the spread, s, between lending rates of the bank cost of capital
may in some cases be a rational response to declines in the volatility of the
underlying asset. In this case,
aP aV OM OM as
Ocr OC aOu Os Ocr (2)
Assuming the volatility of the asset is fully diversifiable, that is,
8 Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, Mortgage Put Options and Real Estate Markets, 38
J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 89 (2009).
9 Option-adjusted spread denotes the spread of a lending rate over the risk-free rate adjusted
for the leverage with which the asset is purchased ("loan-to-value ratio") and other characteristics of the
asset that capture property-specific risks. The option-adjusted spread in our model accounts for the
market risk in the loan outside the property and loan-specific characteristics.
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av-=0,
aoc
the right-hand side of Equation (2) equals zero because the spread adjusts to
compensate the lender for the changes in the value of the put option embedded
in the mortgage loan, that is,
aM a as
ao as ac




but is still relatively small.' 0
The response of the asset price to the spread is:
ap avaP aPo a/ -r0  (3)
as Ds aa
Therefore, the correlation between transaction prices and lending spread is
zero if the increase in asset volatility is diversifiable, and close to zero if it
affects the covariance between the asset and the overall market.
If, on the other hand, the spread declines because of underpricing, rather
than in response to changes in expected future asset volatility, then the response
of the price to the spread is very different:
as aV am
au 0 as as (4)
therefore,
a1'aVaOM aMap=a m-_a < 0 (5)as as as as
In other words, if the decline in the spread of lending rates over the risk-
free interest rate is due to lender underpricing of credit risk, then asset prices
move above fundamental levels.
The increase in price due to underpriced lending is magnified in a market
with a large concentration of credit-constrained borrowers. Underpriced
financing induces borrowers not only to overpay for the assets because they
obtain cheap financing, but also to demand more assets because they are now
less constrained. The interplay of these two effects magnifies the price
increases, especially in supply-constrained markets.
10 The price impact of real-estate volatility changes through the covariance with the overall
market is likely to be far smaller than the impact through changing the value of the option to default.
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B. Lender Response to Rising Asset Prices
Consider next a lender who needs to maintain a zero expected rate of
return on the entire portfolio, including old and new loans." Such incentives
can arise from a reserve requirement based on the risk of the entire portfolio or
any other regulatory risk-management requirement based on the entire
portfolio. It can also arise from short-term focus of the loan or security
originators who can use the institution's apparently strong balance sheet to
cover poor underwriting standards on new originations.'2 Let cx denote the
proportion of new loans relative to the entire portfolio. Assume that the
weighted average option-adjusted spread on the entire portfolio needs to be
above a certain regulatory or shareholder-imposed minimum level s*. The
lender then needs to set the spread on the new loans s" so that the weighted
average spread on the entire portfolio is s*:
(1 - a)s ° + as" > s * (6)
where s' denotes the weighted average option-adjusted spread on the
existing old loans. As underlying real-estate asset prices rise, the equity cushion
of the existing loans increases, making them safer. In loan pricing terms, this
relationship means the option-adjusted spread on the old loans increases: 13
Os°
->0 (7)OP
This relationship also allows the lender to charge a lower spread on the
new loans and still maintain the overall weighted option-adjusted spread at the
regulatory-required minimum s*. The spread on new loans then is determined
by Equation (8):
S" ___ -I- ~' (8)
a
Since the option-adjusted spread on old loans, s', increases with asset
prices, the spread on new loans, s", decreases with an increase in current asset
prices:
as" _(1-a) Os ° < - 0 (9)
lopa or
In other words, the spread on new loans declines as current asset prices
increase. At the same time, prices increase as the spread on new loans falls (as
shown by Equation (5)), leading to a further decrease in spread and even higher
1 1 Since we assume a risk-neutral lender, zero expected rate of return on the portfolio is the
goal of the lender. This rate of return is computed after costs are covered and capital in the business is
compensated. In a competitive market and under the risk-neutral investor assumption, all firms target a
zero expected rate of return.
12 See supra note 10.
13 The option-adjusted spread increases even if the interest rate on the loans remains the same
because the loans are now safer and the original spread is too high relative to the risk of those loans.
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asset prices. In a steady state, the spread of lending rates over the risk-free rate
approaches zero, and asset prices are as if the investment is risk-free.
III. Potential Solutions
In what follows we explore why short-selling did not contain asset
mispricing and did not work as a potential market mechanism that could break
the cycle set by Equations (5) and (9).
A. Short-Selling the Underlying Asset
One such possibility is to allow investors to short-sell the underlying real-
estate asset. Since the asset price takes the best outcomes as certain, the most a
short-seller would lose is the risk-free rate of return. The upside for a short-
seller, however, is large, as all outcomes but the absolute best result in positive,
and sometimes substantial, payoffs to a short position. Real estate is difficult to
sell short, however, so this potential solution is purely theoretical.
B. Short-Selling the Lender
Short-selling the lender can potentially mitigate and even break the cycle
of Equations (5) and (9), but is unlikely to be effective because the entire bank
book, including old and new loans, appears to have proper capital reserves. Of
course this is just an illusion, as the increase in the option-adjusted spread on
old loans is purely artificial and due to the availability of underpriced lending,
not on real-estate market fundamentals. Once underpriced lending is
eliminated, the artificially increased option-adjusted spreads on the old loans
are also eliminated, and the lender finds itself in a reserve shortfall position.
But going short on the bank loans requires the ability to maintain the short
position until underpriced lending is eliminated from the market place, which
may take a very long time. Therefore, the effectiveness of short-selling the
lender shares works only for investors who can maintain the short position
through a period of substantial bank share increases.
Furthermore, as Richard Green and his coauthors show, bank shares tend
to decline to a far smaller extent than real-estate prices because banks have
diverse investments and lines of business.14 Therefore, short-selling bank
shares creates a basis risk for the investor even if he correctly detects the over-
pricing of real-estate assets.
14 Richard Green, Robert Mariano, Andrey Pavlov & Susan Wachter, Misaligned Incentives
and Mortgage Lending in Asia (Univ. of Pa. Law School Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 08-
27, 2007), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1287687#.
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C. Short-selling of Specific Loans or Loan Pools
The last possibility is that investors are able to short-sell specific loans (or
loan pools), in particular the new loans made by the lender. These loans offer
little or no compensation for risk, thus the losses to a short-seller are limited to
the risk-free rate of return.1 5 Gains, on the other hand, are potentially
significant as the new loans under-perform relative to the risk-free assets or
even relative to older loans. This strategy is not without risk, as even the new
loans can perform well for extended periods of time, but they are most exposed
to elimination of underpriced loans in the market. In other words, the latest
loans are most vulnerable to unwinding of the positions banks have taken over
the years.
While attractive in theory, this mechanism cannot occur without a directed
market regulation. Individual players have incentives to keep trades private and
over-the-counter, and see no need to report prices or pool details to the broad
markets. Therefore, to benefit from the ability to short-sell specific loans or
pools, the market requires trade reporting requirements similar to those for
stocks and many bonds, as well as an established and transparent mechanism
for investors to express negative views and place negative market bets.
In summary, of the three possibilities listed above, short-selling of
individual loans, or loan pools of similar vintage and characteristics, is the most
effective ways for investors to break the cycle set off by lenders and real-estate
investors acting according to Equations (5) and (9).
IV. Conclusion
Today's crisis in the United States emerged from a tectonic shift in the
source and pricing for funding mortgage-backed securities (MBS). While
historically securitization has played a large role in the United States in the
trading of MBS, investors had been exposed to interest-rate risk only. Mortgage
default risk was contained by underwriting, was not priced, and was not borne
by investors. With the growth of a private-label subprime market, the
characteristics of mortgage default risk changed. With private-label MBS,
investors bore default risk; while this risk should have been priced, as systemic
risk grew, the pricing of risk did not increase. This Essay attempts to explain
why.
During the market evolution, fees drove the demand for securitization at
every stage of the newly functionally differentiated production of mortgages.
Banks received fees to originate and to distribute loans, the secondary market
received fees to bundle mortgages, rating agencies received fees to rate the
pools, and insurers received fees for issuing credit default swaps (CDS) used to
15 If a loan does not account for any risk, its rate of return is just the risk-free rate of return. If
the loan repays with no loss, a short-seller of that loan would have to pay the original owner of the loan
the risk-free rate on the loan.
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hedge holdings of MBS. At each stage, entities were able to book fees without
exposure to long-term risks.
Due to incomplete markets, asset prices increase with the pro-cyclical
production of loans. These price increases lower the perceived risk and the
price of risk, inaccurately reflecting the risk of real-estate loans on banks'
balance sheets. In the absence of instruments to short-sell fundamentally
mispriced but marked-to-model rather than marked-to-market assets, it is not
possible to counter the positive impact of additional (though temporary)
mortgage supply on the demand for housing. As Richard Herring and Susan
Wachter show, 16 real-estate booms and banking busts tend to go together. The
current financial upheaval is only the most recent in a series of financial crises
in which property-based asset booms are accompanied by increases in systemic
risk. Asset bubbles, in the absence of arbitrage, occur pro-cyclically, and the
result is the production of systemic risk as liquidity providers increase their
lending based on current above-market-fundamentals pricing of these assets.
Historically, the credit-induced asset-price bubble covers up the
deterioration in credit standards, and in the absence of downward price pressure
through short-selling, results in an extended period of bubble formation. If
either tradable indexes (and derivatives and other market-tradable instruments)
that permitted investors to short-sell mispriced assets or prudential oversight of
difficult-to-short products had been in place, one or both of the measures could
have countered the production of systemic risk.
16 Richard Herring & Susan M. Wachter, Real Estate Booms and Banking Busts: An
International Perspective (Group of Thirty, Working Paper No. 99-27, 1999), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=175348.
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Appendix
Table 1: Changes in Mortgage Ori ination by Product
17
FHA/VA Conv/Conf Jumbo Subprime Alt-A HEL
(Reduction) (Reduction) (Reduction) (Increase) (Increase) (Increase)
2001 8% 57% 20% 7% 2% 5%
2002 7% 63% 21% 1% 2% 6%
2003 6% 62% 16% 8% 2% 6%
2004 4% 41% 17% 18% 6% 12%
2005 3% 35% 18% 20% 12% 12%
2006 3% 33% 16% 20% 13% 14%
2007 4% 48% 14% 8% 11% 15%
Table 2A: Deterioration of Lending Standards, 2002-2006
s18
Orig CLTV CLTV Seconds Full 10% DTI FICO Investor WAC SpdtoWAC
Year >80 Doc. <700
Prime 2002 66.4 4.1 1.9 56.0 46 31.0 20.7 0.7 5.5 --
2003 68.2 10.1 10.9 48.6 53 31.8 21.8 1.6 4.6 --
2004 73.5 20.7 23.1 51.2 71 33.5 22.0 2.1 4.5 --
2005 74.1 21.7 26.8 47.3 81 33.6 18.9 1.9 5.4 -
2006 75.3 26.2 35.3 33.6 91 37.2 19.5 2.3 6.2 --
Alt-A 2002 74.3 20.8 2.7 29.3 26 35.4 46.4 9.9 6.3 0.8
2003 78.0 33.3 23.4 28.1 56 35.3 44.7 12.9 5.6 1.0
2004 82.6 46.9 39.1 32.6 75 36.2 44.3 15.3 5.5 1.0
2005 83.5 49.6 46.9 28.3 83 37.0 40.5 16.5 6.0 0.6
2006 83.0 55.4 55.4 19.0 87 38.3 44.2 13.5 6.8 0.6
Sub- 2002 81.2 46.8 3.7 66.9 1 40.0 93.4 4.7 8.5 3.0
prime 2003 83.5 55.6 9.9 63.5 5 40.2 91.6 4.9 7.5 2.9
2004 85.3 61.1 19.1 59.9 20 40.6 90.6 5.3 7.1 2.6
2005 86.6 64.4 28.1 55.9 32 41.2 89.7 5.4 7.3 1.9
2006 86.7 64.0 31.0 54.6 20 42.1 91.8 5.7 8.2 2.0
17 1 INSIDE MORTGAGE FINANCE, MORTGAGE MARKET STATISTICAL ANNUAL (2008).
18 Jesse M. Abraham, Andrey Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the United States'
Uniquely Bad Housing Market, 12 WHARTON REAL ESTATE REV. 24, 35-36 (2008).
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Table 2B: Mortgage Statistics
1 9
Mortgage Information
Year of Origination 1999 2003 2006
Subprime Loans 512,476 1,426,503 2,376,949
Alt-A Loans 84,233 413,494 872,208
Total Number of Loans 596,710 1,840,040 3,251,355
ARM Loans 187,219 920,304 1,723,079
ARM Margin 6 6 5
ARM Teaser (% of ARM loans) 0.92 0.39 0.95
Interest-Only Loans 1,169 95,870 725,317
Figure 1: Price Appreciation Controlled for Volatility
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19 Raphael Bostic et al, Mortgage Product Substitution and State Anti-Predatory Lending
Laws: Better Loans and Better Borrowers?, (Mar. 23, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Yale Journal on Regulation).
20 Jesse M. Abraham, Andrey Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the United States'
Uniquely Bad Housing Market, 12 WHARTON REAL ESTATE REV. 24 (2008).

